




















THE HIV ANTICIPATORY SAVING MOTIVE: AN EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 



























ISSN 0924-7815 The HIV Anticipatory Saving Motive: an Empirical 
Analysis in South Africa 
 
 
G. van de Kuilen, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands 
vdkuilen@few.eur.nl, Department of Economics, Erasmus University 




J. Lammers, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands 
Judith.Lammers@uvt.nl, Department of Economics, Tilburg University 







ABSTRACT  This paper studies the effect of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on saving behaviour. Two 
important characteristics of HIV result in opposing forces on savings: mortality increases, 
which reduces savings, and long-term illness risk increases, which enhances savings. We use 
a two period life-cycle model with uncertain lifetime including perceived HIV contamination 
risk to illustrate both the opposing effects of the HIV epidemic on individual savings and test 
the predictions of our model with data obtained from an economic experiment with real 
monetary incentives performed in South Africa. The empirical results show that increased 
mortality decreases the amount of savings and that having a high perception of HIV 











KEYWORDS:  HIV/AIDS, saving behavior, illness risk, mortality, life-cycle model, time 
preferences. 
JEL CODES: D12, D91,  E21, I12.   2
I. Introduction 
After its discovery in the late 1970s, the HIV/AIDS epidemic has rapidly developed into a 
widespread catastrophe in Sub-Saharan Africa. Over 25 million people have died of AIDS 
related diseases and 38.6 million people are living with HIV worldwide. High levels of adult 
prevalence rates are concentrated in Southern Africa with 18.8 per cent in South Africa 
(UNAIDS, 2006). The erosion of some of the main determinants of economic growth such as 
social capital, domestic savings, and human capital caused by HIV/AIDS damages both social 
and economic development. Many studies have been written on the effects of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic on economic growth. However, little attention has thus far been given to the 
possible indirect economic behavioural effects of HIV epidemic. The effect of HIV/AIDS on 
individual saving behaviour is the central topic of this paper.   
Once HIV infected, uninsured individuals face a long period of high expenses. The 
treatment of the disease requires additional expenses on healthy food and medical treatment. 
Steinberg et al. (2002), for example, show that in South Africa, AIDS affected households 
spend more than a third of households’ income on private medical care. At the same time, 
however, the disease lowered income with one third as a result of a decrease in productivity or 
loss of job.  
While in developed countries families with sick members are able to access formal 
insurance markets, families in low-income countries must rely on informal mechanisms like 
participating in informal insurance groups (LeMay, 2006), or individual savings. LeMay 
(2006) shows that while 51 per cent of the households in Cotonou (Benin) made expenses 
related to funerals and/or illness during the last six months, only 18 per cent of the surveyed 
observations were participating in some form of insurance, to cover these costs. Dercon and 
Krishnan (2000) show that although risk-sharing does occur within poor households in 
Ethiopia, full insurance against illness shocks does not. This might be due to the inability to 
predict actual illness risk and the associated costs. Pettifor et al. (2004) for instance, show that 
the youth in South Africa is indeed unable to correctly predict their HIV infection risk: only 
21 per cent of the HIV positive youths qualified their risk as high, whereas 62 per cent 
reported to have a small HIV infection risk or no infection risk at all. Another explanation for 
underinsurance can be that households cannot afford full insurance and therefore save instead.   3
Several impact studies like Booysen & Visser (2006) and Marzo (2004) show that HIV 
affected households fall into chronic poverty. This fact could stimulate unaffected households 
to anticipate the costs of illness by increasing savings. 
It could thus be hypothesized that there is a positive relationship between HIV 
contamination risk and individual savings: individuals with a high contamination risk increase 
savings if they take the possible additional future costs caused by the illness into account 
when deciding how much to save. We will call this hypothesis the HIV anticipatory saving 
hypothesis. On the other hand, being HIV infected significantly reduces life expectancy. 
Therefore, the probability of reaching the retirement age declines and agents will be less 
inclined to safe in order to have income when retired. Because the HIV epidemic causes both 
a decrease in life expectancy and an increase in the expectancy of near future illness, the 
overall effect of the HIV epidemic on individual saving behaviour is ambiguous. 
Although to the best of our knowledge the HIV anticipatory saving hypothesis has not 
been tested empirically, results from existing studies on the economics of HIV/AIDS do 
indirectly support the presence of the aforementioned opposing effects of the HIV epidemic 
on saving behaviour. For example, Ferreira and Pessoa (2003), and Freire (2004) found a 
negative relationship between the HIV epidemic and saving behaviour due to a fall in life 
expectancy. In his study about the macroeconomic effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic using 
cross-country regressions, Bonnel (2000) found that the increase in the HIV prevalence rate 
from 1990 to 1996 reduced the savings rate in developing countries with -0.61 percentage 
points. Bonnel (2000) does however mention that in a well-established HIV epidemic savings 
could increase because households increase their savings to cover the expected higher medical 
costs if they view the risk of contracting AIDS related diseases as significant. Kochar (2004) 
found that higher expectations about future illness increased overall savings in Pakistani 
households, as predicted by the HIV anticipatory saving hypothesis. Pradhan et al. (2006) 
empirically show that HIV affected households
1 in India have lower levels of savings and 
almost half of these households had either borrowed money or liquidated assets for 
consumption. 
This paper presents a two-period lifetime optimization model that illustrates the opposing 
effects of HIV contamination risk on individual saving behaviour. This model is based on the   4
life-cycle theory (Ando & Modigliani, 1957), which posits that agents smooth consumption 
over their expected lifetime. We test the predictions of our simple model using data from a 
laboratory experiment with real monetary incentives held among students in South Africa. 
The results indicate that both effects of the HIV epidemic (increased mortality and increased 
illness risk) indeed affect individual saving behaviour as predicted by our model. The results 
thus plead for educating the population with correct and actual information on the magnitude 
of the disease and their actual lifetime HIV contamination risk. Providing this information 
will encourage savings and thus will reduce the welfare loss caused by the HIV epidemic.      
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a simple 
two-period lifetime optimization model to illustrate the opposing effects of the HIV epidemic 
on individual saving behaviour. Section 3 presents the experimental design followed by the 
experimental and estimation results in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.   
 
II. Model 
We consider a country where a large group of agents (normalized to one) optimizes 
consumption over two periods. When HIV starts to spread it affects individual savings in the 
following way. First, the period over which agents optimize consumption declines because 
there is a fall in life expectancy. The model operationalizes this effect through an increase in 
perceived mortality risk. We assume that HIV contaminated agents will not enter the second 
period. Second, in a well-established HIV epidemic, agents will become aware of the HIV 
contamination risk they face. Agents understand the necessity of expensive medical treatment 
whenever they become HIV positive. This enhances savings, as predicted by the HIV 
anticipatory saving hypothesis.  
Agents face a mortality risk q (that is, with probability q agents do not enter the second 
period) and a certain risk p of contracting HIV. Agents optimize a simple logarithmic lifetime 
utility function and discount the future with discount factor  1
1 r δ + =  , where ř is the discount 
rate. Agents only earn income W in the first period and earn interest rate r on their savings s in 
the second period. Savings of the deceased are distributed equally among their generation. 
Because agents are aware of the mortality risk of their generation, they consider the transfers 
of the deceased in the expected future income when optimizing their lifetime utility. The   5






− = . Agents can spend income on regular consumption (ci) in both periods, but to keep 
things simple we assume that only HIV contaminated agents are allowed to spend income on 
medical treatment, m2 with price Pm. The parameter  0 μ >  is the marginal rate of substitution 
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Taking first derivatives with respect to q and p illustrates the opposite effects that the HIV 
epidemic has on individual savings. A marginal increase in mortality risk (q) negatively 
affects the amount of money agents save. However, a marginal increase in perceived HIV 
contraction risk (p) induces people to save more (consume less) in the first period. Note that 
for  01 μ <≤  the marginal effect of an increase in p on savings in this model is smaller than 
the effect of a marginal increase in q. The more important medical consumption becomes 
compared to regular consumption the larger the relative effect of the HIV anticipatory saving 
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A limitation of this simple two-period model is that medical consumption does not prolong 
lifetime of HIV positive agents. Incorporating this effect would enhance the HIV anticipatory 
saving motive even further. 
 
III. Experimental Design 
To test the predictions of our simple model, we used data from an economic experiment with 
real monetary incentives held among students in South Africa. This experiment builds on the 
discount rate experiments of Coller and Williams (1999) and Harrison et al. (2002). This 
section presents a short description of the experimental design. For a more detailed 




A total of N = 213 students (114 males and 99 females) from a wide range of disciplines 
recruited at the Northwest University and the University of Pretoria in South Africa 
participated in the experiment. Students took part in 12 groups of around 20 respondents each. 
82.0 per cent of the respondents was black South African, 15 per cent of the respondents was 
white, and the remaining 3 per cent was coloured. The average age of the white participants 
(15%) was 21.1 years (ranging from 19 till 24 years) whereas the average age of non-white 
(coloured and black South African) participants was 22.9 years (ranging from 18 till 36 
years). On average non-white students were poorer; the income distribution of non-white 
subjects is skewed to the left whereas the income distribution of white students is skewed to 
the right.  
 
Procedure 
At the start of the experiment, subjects received experimental instructions and the random 
devices used throughout the experiment (a bingo cage containing 100 balls, a 6-sided die, and 
a 10-sided die) were presented to subjects. In the instructions it was emphasized that the   7
experiment was anonymous (since it also involved sensitive questions related to health states) 
and that there were no right or wrong answers. Both at the start and at the end of the 
experiment, participants were asked to fill out a short questionnaire. The first questionnaire 
concerned questions regarding socio-demographic characteristics such as age, gender, race 
etc., while the questionnaire at the end of the experiment concerned questions on financial 
instruments such as whether the participant did save or not and the current balance on 
participants’ savings account and health related questions including questions on perceived 
HIV contamination risk, HIV status and perceived life expectancy.  
 
Stimuli  
Because individual time preferences play a central role in saving behaviour, we measured 
individual discount rates in the experiment. More specifically, we adjusted the so-called 
multiple price list design (MPL) used by Harrison et al. (2002) to our setting. Participants 
were asked to make 20 outright choices between two options, called option A and option B, 
by simply encircling the preferred option on a sheet of paper. Both options yielded monetary 
prizes at specified dates. More specifically, option A yielded 172 Rand in X months, while 
option B yielded an amount of Y Rand in Z months. The amount Y that option B yielded 
increased after each choice, starting at Y = 172.43 Rand. Thus, option B became more and 
more attractive after each choice. In addition, participants received information about the 
annual interest rate that reflected the different prizes offered by option B, similar to Coller and 
Williams (1999) and Harrison et al. (2002). The options were presented in a table format 
similar to Table 1 reproduced below, as to make the task as easy and transparent as possible. 
 
Motivating Participants 
In addition to a show-up fee of 30 Rand, we used performance-based real incentives to 
motivate participants based on the random lottery incentive system, the nowadays almost 
exclusively used incentive system for individual choice experiments (Holt and Laury, 2002). 
The main advantage of this system is that it avoids income effects such as Thaler and 
Johnson’s (1990) house money effect, while it has been shown empirically that it is indeed 
incentive compatible, that is, agents do not interpret choice tasks rewarded with the random   8
lottery incentive system as one grand overall lottery (Cubitt et al. 1998, Starmer and Sugden 
1991). Since the task reported here was part of a larger experiment that all involved outright 
choices between two options, the probability that one of the chosen options would be played 
out for real was low. When selected for additional payment, subjects received a post-dated 
check issued by Tilburg University, which could be cashed at any Standard Bank in South 
Africa any time after the specified date.       
 
























1 R 172 R 182.60 3% A B
2 R 172 R 193.76 6% A B
3 R 172 R 205.51 9% A B
4 R 172 R 217.88 12% A B
5 R 172 R 230.90 15% A B
6 R 172 R 244.60 18% A B
7 R 172 R 259.00 21% A B
8 R 172 R 274.14 24% A B
9 R 172 R 290.05 27% A B
10 R 172 R 306.76 30% A B
11 R 172 R 324.30 33% A B
12 R 172 R 342.72 36% A B
13 R 172 R 362.05 39% A B
14 R 172 R 382.32 42% A B
15 R 172 R 403.58 45% A B
16 R 172 R 425.87 48% A B
17 R 172 R 449.22 51% A B
18 R 172 R 473.69 54% A B
19 R 172 R 499.32 57% A B
20 R 172 R 526.15 60% A B
Option B
To be paid in 24 months
Option A
To be paid in 1 month (Circle A or B)
Your choice  9
There is empirical evidence that agents are more impatient about immediate delays than they 
are about future delays of the same length (Coller and Williams, 1999). Therefore, the timing 
of the prizes of both options varied between treatments. More specifically, in one treatment, 
called NFED (no front end delay), option A always yielded an immediate prize while option 
B yielded a prize that would be paid in 23 months. In the other treatment, called FED (front 
end delay), option A always yielded a prize that would be paid in one month while option B 





First of all, the results show that most students owned a savings account: 64.4 per cent of our 
subjects reported to save and of these 52.6 per cent reported to use informal saving methods. 
82 per cent reported to save using a formal account. Table 2 below shows how saving 
behaviour differs among groups of subjects having different levels of perceived HIV 
contamination risk classified by no risk at all, small, moderate, high or HIV positive.  
 
























Not at all  54 
(27.4%)  30.8% 65.4%  78.8%  55.9%  1.54  38.36 
Small  83 
(42.1%)  39.3% 61.4%  80.0%  51.9%  1.53  41.30 
Moderate  28 
(14.2%)  17.9% 60.7%  94.1%  70.6%  1.99  38.09 
High  25 
(12.7%)  28.0% 64.0%  73.3%  37.5%  2.19  44.61 
HIV positive  23 
(10.8%)  30.4% 78.3%  88.9%  44.4%  3.09  25.72 
Total  213 
(100%)  32.1% 64.4%  82.0%  52.6%  1.72  38.80 
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Subjects with a high perception of HIV contamination risk and HIV positive subjects appear 
to save more often compared to subjects that indicated to perceive their contamination risk as 
small or moderate. The amount of savings of HIV positive subjects and subjects with a high 
perception of HIV contamination risk is also significantly higher compared to the other 
groups (t=-2.165, p-value=0.030). Note however, that the group of subjects that indicated to 
perceive their contraction risk as high did report to use both informal and formal saving 
methods less frequently. The amount of savings among those who have a savings account 
however, is higher for this group and for the group of HIV positive respondents. 
 
Life Expectancy 
Due to the HIV pandemic, life expectancy in South Africa has fallen from an average of 63.2 
years to 42.7 years over the period 1990-2006 (U.S. Census Bureau 2006). The reported life 
expectancy of our subjects varies from 25 to 120 years, with a mean of 72.4 years, which is 
substantially higher than the country average for people at age 20-24, which varies from 55 to 
60 years (WHO 2007). Subjects who indicated to be HIV positive reported a significantly 
lower life expectancy (59.1 years). Subjects who have a higher perceived HIV contraction risk 
reported an average life expectancy of 68.9 years, which is 4.6 years lower compared to 
subjects who indicated to have a lower risk. 
 
Perceived HIV Contamination Risk 
The largest part of the subjects (80.9%) reported that HIV is the major cause of death in the 
North West province.  Tuberculosis, a disease that is an important cause of death for many 
HIV infected patients, was seen as the second most important cause of death (60.3%). This 
shows some understanding of the HIV epidemic among the subjects. Subjects estimated their 
own risk of getting HIV infected significantly lower than the risk of other students. 
Although 57.2 per cent of the non-white participants indicated that the HIV contamination 
risk of other students was high, only 15.9 per cent of them perceived their own HIV 
contamination risk as high. None of the subjects reported that other subjects’ HIV 
contamination risk was zero, whereas 27.5 per cent indicated that their own HIV 
contamination risk was zero. 25.0 per cent of the white participants reported to perceive 
others’ HIV contamination risk as high, which is rather low compared to the 57.1 per cent of   11
the non-white participants. In general, these numbers again show a substantial awareness of 
HIV among subjects participating in the experiment. 
The overall reported HIV prevalence rate among the sample was 10.9 per cent. However, 
4.7 per cent of the subjects indicated to prefer not to report their test- or HIV status. This 
prevalence rate is comparable with the average prevalence rate (9.9%) among the youth in the 
North West province (Pettifor et al., 2004), but the observed prevalence rate is high if we 
consider the fact that among the students that are HIV positive only 10 per cent is also aware 
of their status (Pettifor et al., 2004). Finally, 12.7 per cent of subjects indicated to have a high 
HIV contamination risk (see Table 2).  
 
Discount Rates 
For each individual we estimated the individual discount rate by taking the average discount 
rate when a subject switched from choosing option A to option B. Thus, for example, from the 
choices made by the hypothetical subject whose choices are listed in the fifth column of Table 
2, we would infer that the individual discount rate was equal to 25.5 per cent.  
The resulting average discount rate over all sessions was 34.78 per cent, which is 
substantially higher than an average discount rate of 24.2 per cent obtained by Harrison et al. 
(2002). This implies that the average South African is more impatient than the average Dane, 
which is perhaps not surprising if we consider the economic differences between both 
countries. Compared to previous studies conducted in Western countries, we find that a 
remarkable large proportion of subjects (42.6%) switched between the options more than 
once. If a participant switched more than once between options, then the discount rate was 
assumed to be equal to the midpoint of the interval over which the subject is indifferent.  
As Table 2 shows, subjects with high-perceived HIV contamination risk had a higher 
discount rate in the experiment. On the other hand, subjects who knew that they are HIV 
positive strikingly showed to be very patient. HIV infection thus seems to affect discount rates 
which may be explained by the HIV anticipatory saving hypothesis: HIV positive subjects 
might be aware of the additional spending they will face at the time they become ill, and are 
therefore prepared to delay consumption for a relatively long time. The last column of Table 2 
displays the average discount rates for each group of subjects. The observed discount rates are   12
in agreement with ‘common sense’ observations. Among the subjects who considered 
themselves to have no HIV contamination risk at all, a relatively large percentage had the 
lowest discount rate, while, on the other hand, among the group of subjects that indicated to 
have a high contamination risk, a relatively large percentage had the highest discount rate. 
Our findings are supported by Chesson et al. (2006) who show that unsafe sexual behaviour is 
positively related to time preferences.  
The major drawback of the experimental method as often applied in Western countries is 
the debatable assumption that subjects are credit constrained. The financial data of our 
sample, however, shows that this assumption among students in South Africa is less 
contentious. Subjects appear to have little arbitrage possibilities. Only 9.9 per cent of the 
subjects reported to have a line of credit. Furthermore, only 15.9 per cent reported to have a 
chance of at least 90 per cent of being approved to obtain a loan if they would go to a bank. 
 
Estimation Results 
In order to test the hypothesis that there is a significant positive relationship between saving 
behaviour and perceived HIV contamination risk and life expectancy as predicted by the life 
savings model presented in Section 2 while controlling for individual differences between 
discount rates, marital status, gender, race, and the probability of obtaining a loan, we 
performed a Simple Ordered Probit regression analysis using the amount of savings on a 4-
point scale as the dependent variable. To capture the variation in socio-economic background 
of our subjects, we included a dummy for subjects who lived in an informal dwelling in the 
regression. The results of this simple regression are reported in Table 3 below.  
First of all, as can be seen in the table, students that reported to have a small probability of 
obtaining a loan significantly save less. This finding can be explained by the lack of income to 
be able to save and the related lack of collateral to obtain a loan. White students appear to 
significantly save more, possibly because they face less liquidity constraints. 
Interestingly, there is a significant positive relationship between perceived HIV 
contamination risk and the amount of savings. This finding supports the HIV anticipatory 
saving hypothesis: If individuals consider the risk of contracting the virus and are aware of the 
related costs of being HIV infected, they save in order to anticipate these costs. The HIV   13
positive subjects in our sample significantly save more as well. It should be noted here, that 
all our HIV positive subjects did not have AIDS yet. Although their spending pattern might 
already have changed (in order to delay the development of HIV into AIDS, infected 
individuals need things like balanced food, and medical care etc.), the most expensive period 
in which they are going to need extensive medical care and treatment is still to come. The 
savings effect for HIV positive students appear to be higher than those of students who 
perceive to be highly at risk, which can be explained by the fact that HIV positive students 
know for sure that the expensive period is looming ahead, while for the other group this is still 
just a risk. 
 
Table 3. Estimation Results 
 Estimate  Standard  Error 
Discount Rate  0.003 0.004 
Female  -0.065 0.267
 
White  1.210 0.388
*** 
Urban  -0.365 0.293 
Informal Dwelling  0.664 0.423 





HIV Positive  1.463 0.443
*** 




Medical Insurance  -0.752 0.341
** 
Poor Chances Loan  -0.541  0.273** 
Dependent variable: amount of savings on a 4-point scale 
 
In addition, Table 3 shows that students who have medical insurance, and therefore do not 
expect a dramatic increase in expenditures in case they become infected, save significantly 
less. Savings thus appears to be a substitute for medical insurance. This is not surprising in a   14
country where many people do not have access to or cannot afford to have full medical 
insurance and as a result use savings as ‘insurance’ for illness risk. The coefficient for a 
positive HIV status appears to be higher than that for the dummy for medical insurance. This 
indicates that medical insurance alone does not insure individuals for the full costs of illness. 
The fall in income and the need for a different consumption pattern seems to enhance savings 
as well.  
Perceived life expectancy significantly increases the amount of savings as well, which is 
in line with what life cycle theory predicts. Thus, our empirical results clearly show that both 
opposing effects of HIV on individual saving behaviour are present in our data. The overall 
effect of a fall in life expectancy with, for example, 15 years on savings is less than the effect 
of having a high perception of HIV contamination risk are being HIV positive. This implies 
that individual savings among participants in the experiment are positively affected by the 
HIV epidemic overall.   
Although students that had lived in informal dwellings appear to save more (p-
value=0.116), the other variables, gender, urban, and individuals’ discount rate have an 
insignificant effect on the amount of money students save. 
 
V. Conclusion  
This paper presents empirical evidence that suggests that the HIV epidemic has a positive 
effect on individual saving behaviour, as predicted by the HIV anticipatory saving hypothesis. 
To illustrate this effect we used a simple life cycle model that includes mortality risk and HIV 
contracting risk. The HIV anticipatory saving hypothesis posits that in a well-established HIV 
epidemic, agents consider the improved risk of contracting HIV and will save additionally to 
be able to make possible future expenses on medical treatment or a decrease in income due to 
illness. Results from a regression model with data from a laboratory experiment using real 
monetary incentives in which we controlled for differences between individual discount rates, 
gender, race, way of life, the probability of obtaining a loan, and having medical insurance, 
show that there is a nonlinear relationship between HIV prevalence rate and saving behaviour. 
The results show that HIV contamination risk and a positive HIV status positively affects 
savings. Furthermore, we find that although individual saving is a substitute for medical   15
insurance, the total increase in savings cannot be explained by the lack of medical insurance 
alone. Individuals seem to save on top of that for, for example, a lack of future income and 
additional illness-related expenditures not covered by medical insurance. 
The HIV epidemic seriously affects economic growth by the erosion of social and human 
capital, domestic savings, and human capital. This study shows that it is also important that 
the population of countries hit by the HIV/AIDS epidemic knows its contamination risk from 
an economic point of view. Anticipatory saving improves the coping ability of HIV/AIDS 
infected households. Government inaction with respect to HIV knowledge will make the 
countries where the HIV epidemic is spreading worse off with respect to economic growth 
and welfare through the negative effects on the amount of savings caused by an increase in 
mortality risk. Our results therefore plead for HIV prevention campaigns that encourage HIV 
testing and educate the population with correct and actual information on the magnitude of the 
disease and their actual lifetime HIV contamination risk. These policies will induce an HIV 
anticipatory saving motive and thus positively affect social welfare and may therefore partly 
indemnify the disastrous effects that the HIV epidemic has on the hardest hit countries. 
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1.  A HIV affected household in the most limited definition is a household that consists of at least one 
infected member. In the broadest definition every household in the hardest hit countries are HIV affected 
since the far-reaching consequences of the disease in society. In this paper, by affected household, we 
mean the limited definition. 
   16
 
2.  μ > 1 shows the importance of medication since it improves the quality of life. μ < 1 might incorporate the 
disutility of taking medicines. 
3.  In this paper medical consumption is a generic term for the additional consumption that is advised for 
HIV infected individuals. It includes for example medical care and treatment, healthy balanced food, 
supplements and immune boosters and so forth. 
4.  We use the discount rate, which is corrected for mortality, risk aversion, and the treatment effect as 
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